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The Lategan case:1 The accrual principle – then and 
now
L. van Zyl
5A B S T R A C T
11In 1926, the landmark Lategan case was the fi rst case to determine the 
meaning of the words “accrued to or in favour of” in the defi nition of 
gross income as defi ned in section 1 of the Income Tax Act. According 
to the decision in that case, income generally accrues to a person when 
that person is entitled to an amount (the timing rule), but the amount 
to which the taxpayer is entitled to must be valued to determine the 
value of the accrual to be included in gross income. The valuation of the 
accrual is determined by discounting the accrual to its present value at 
year end (and not the face value). The valuation part of the judgment 
was legislatively nullifi ed in 1990 with retrospective effect to 1962, and 
the face value of the amount to which the taxpayer is entitled is the 
amount that has accrued.
12The timing rule violates both the canons of equity and of convenience. 
The timing rule also causes undue hardship to taxpayers by taxing 
amounts before they have been received. It is submitted that it may be 
time to test the timing rule constitutionally. It is also submitted that the 
valuation rule would pass constitutional muster. However, as far as the 
retrospective legislative amendments in respect of the valuation of the 
accrual are concerned, it is further submitted that there is little chance of 
successfully challenging such legislative amendments.
13Key words:  accrual, canons of taxation, “due and payable”, “entitled to”, Income Tax Act, 
retrospective amendments, timing rule, valuation rule
Wine maketh merry: but money answereth all things (Ecclesiastes 10:19)2 
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6The landmark case of W H Lategan v Commissioner for Inland Revenue3 (“Lategan 
case”), decided in 1926, was the first of numerous tax judgments on the interpretation 
of the meaning of the phrase “accrued to or in favour of” in the definition of gross 
income as defined in section 1 of the Income Tax Act (now Act 58 of 1962). Willem 
Hendrik Lategan (the taxpayer and wine farmer) sold wine to De Kooperative 
Wynbouwen Vereniging van Zuid Africa Beperkt (“KWV”). At the end of the year of 
assessment, the taxpayer had not received the full amount for the wine sold to KWV. 
The court was required to rule whether or not amounts due but not yet received by 
the taxpayer should be included in the taxpayer’s gross income. Furthermore, the 
court also addressed the valuation of such amounts. The judgment in the Lategan 
case left an an indelible mark on South African tax law in that it resulted in both a 
timing and valuation rule in respect of accruals of income.
7In South Africa, normal tax is levied on the taxable income of a taxpayer. The 
starting point in the calculation of taxable income is to determine the amounts that 
must be included in “gross income” as defined. The definition of gross income can 
therefore be seen as the cornerstone of income tax in South Africa. The first Income 
Tax Act of South Africa, which was passed in 1914, came into effect on 20 July 1914.4 
The second Income Tax Act5 (“the 1917 Act”) of South Africa was promulgated in 
1917 and was drafted by Alan Frederick Corbett, who became the Commissioner for 
Inland Revenue in 1929.6 Section 6 of the 1917 Act defined “gross income” as “the 
total amount received by or accrued to or in favour of any person other than receipts 
or accruals of a capital nature, in any year or period assessable under this chapter 
from any source within the Union or deemed to be within the Union …”. The core 
elements of the definition of gross income have remained intact from the 1917 Act 
until today.
8Although the decision in Lategan could have been interpreted as having enhanced 
certainty relating to the accrual of an amount for tax purposes, legal uncertainty and 
controversy still persisted for decades. Contradictory meanings were attributed to the 
3 W H Lategan v CIR, 1926 CPD 203, 2 SATC 16.
4 Hattingh, J. 2014. A Century Later, Income Tax Still Rests on a Narrow Base. Business Day Live.[Online] Available: 
www.bdlive.co.za/opinion/2014/05/26/a-century-later-income-tax-still-rests-on-a-narrow-base. [Accessed: 12 Feb-
ruary 2015.]
5 Income Tax (Consolidation) Act 41 of 1917.
6 Kahn, E. 1995. The Quest for Justice: Essays in Honour of Micheal McGregor Corbett Chief Justice of the Supreme Court 
of South Africa, Kenwyn: Juta & Co, Ltd, at 8. Alan Corbett was also the father of Micheal Mcgregor Corbett, who was 
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of South Africa until 1998. Chief Justice M.M. Corbett was one of the other 
four judges concurring with Hefer JA’s judgment in the case of CIR v People’s Stores (Walvis Bay) (Pty) Ltd, 1990 (2) 
SA 365 (A), 52 SATC 9 (hereafter referred to as the People’s Stores case), which fi nally caused the enactment of the 
meaning of the accrual principle in 1990.
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words “accrued to or in favour of” by various courts after 1926 and this controversy 
was only finally resolved (and certainty finally achieved) some 64 years later in 1990.
9The key to the continuing importance of the Lategan case lies, inter alia, in the fact 
that the specific question before the court was about the meaning to be attributed to 
the words “accrued to”. The decision (the ratio decidendi7) as to its meaning established 
legal precedent. In two later cases8 a different meaning was attributed to these words, 
but the meaning so attributable was regarded merely as obiter dicta9 and thus did not 
need to be followed in subsequent cases. The fact that the Supreme Court of Appeal10 
(“the SCA”) in 1990 confirmed the meaning attributable to the words “accrued to” as 
decided in the Lategan case, underlines its continuing importance.
10A good tax system is ideally designed on the basis of the canons of taxation in terms 
of which, inter alia, a balance must be struck between the rights of the taxpayer and 
those of the fiscus.11 Adam Smith12 was the first economist to develop the so-called 
“canons of taxation” in 1776. These canons have come to be accepted internationally 
as characteristics or features of a good tax system. In summarised form, the canons of 
taxation can be stated as equity, certainty, convenience and efficiency.
11Although it might be unrealistic to expect every provision in the Income Tax Act 
58 of 1962 (“the Act”) to comply with or endorse the canons of taxation, it is submitted 
that non-adherence to these principles of a good, equitable and just tax system could 
have a negative impact on tax morality. The legal uncertainty surrounding the 
meaning of “accrual” existed for decades, thereby, it is submitted, compromising the 
canon of certainty. In this article, it will be shown that the canons of equity and 
of convenience have also been compromised by the timing rule established in the 
Lategan case.
12Generally, the facts in reported cases (and to a certain extent unreported cases) 
are limited to the issues in dispute and they do not reveal much about the taxpayer. In 
an attempt to highlight the story behind the facts in the Lategan case, this article first 
focuses on some interesting historical facts about the taxpayer and the farm on which 
the wine that was sold was produced. This is followed by an analysis of the factual 
background on the case and the decisions regarding the meaning of accrual by both 
7 Meaning the rationale or reason for the decision which establishes legal precedent.
8 CIR v Delfos 1933, (AD) 242, 6 SATC 92 at 111 and Hersov’s Estate v CIR, 1957 (1) SA 471 (A), 21 SATC 106.
9 Meaning an incidental remark not establishing legal precedent.
10 In the People’s Stores case.
11 Smith, A. 1776. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of nations, London: Methuen & Co., Ltd.
12 See Emslie, T.S., Davis, D.M., Hutton, S.J. and Olivier, L. 2001. Income Tax Cases and Materials, The Taxpayer, where 




the lower court and the SCA. The “entitled to” meaning of accrual as established 
in the Lategan case, and the restriction thereof to “unconditionally entitled to” in 
the cases of CIR v Ochberg13 and Mooi v SIR,14 are then contrasted with an opposing 
meaning attributed to it in later case law. The opinions of two Commissions of 
Inquiry,15 the generally prevailing practice of Inland Revenue subsequent to the 
Lategan case, and the intervention by the legislature after the People’s Stores case, are 
also discussed to complete the analysis of the meaning of “accrued to”. The impact 
of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 199616 (“the Constitution”), the 
canons of taxation and the retrospective nature of the amendments to the general 
definition of “gross income” on both the timing and valuation rules are then 
considered. The main objective of this article is therefore to establish whether or 
not the timing and valuation rules as established in the Lategan case, on the one 
hand, and the retrospective amendments by the legislature, on the other, would pass 
constitutional muster.
The Lategan legacy
1Johann Hermann Lategan (1711–1786) was born in Germany. He was the first 
Lategan to arrive in South Africa in August 1735 as a VOC17 soldier on the ship, 
PATMOS.18 He was the owner of the farms De Krakeelhoek (later known as 
Welvanpas), Het Doolhof and Nabygelegen in the Wagenmakers Valley, Wellington.19 
Willem Hendrik Lategan (1865–1940), the appellant in the Lategan case, was the 
son of Stephanus Petrus Lategan (1830–1901), who was the fourth generation 
descendant of Johann. Although today the descendants of Willem Hendrik Lategan 
are no longer producing wine, the seventh and eighth generations of Johann, on the 
side of Stephanus’ brother Willem Hendrik Lategan (1827–1917), are still farming 
on the Bergsig Estate in the Breede River Valley, producing some of the finest wines 
in the Western Cape.
2Constantia Uitsig, known until 1940 as Constantia View, was the home of the 
Lategan family for five generations, with Willem Hendrik Lategan being the fifth 
13 Ochberg v CIR, 1933 CPD 256, 6 SATC 1 (hereafter referred to as the Ochberg case).
14 Mooi v SIR,, 1972 (1) SA 674, 34 SATC 1 (hereafter referred to as the Mooi case).
15 The Commission of Inquiry into the Fiscal and Monetary Policy in South Africa. 1970. Taxation in South Africa, Second 
Report, RP 86/1970; and The Commission of Inquiry into the Tax Structure of the Republic of South Africa. 1987. 
Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Tax Structure of the Republic of South Africa, RP 34/1987.
16 Act 108 of 1996.
17 Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie.
18 Maree, A.J. 2007. Van Billmerich na Breerivier. Published privately.
19 Maree, A.J. 2013. Constansie Lategans, Unpublished source of research done into the family history of the Lategan 
family.
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generation.20 Constantia Uitsig had been a portion of Simon van der Stel’s original 
grant of the farm Groot Constantia.21 In 1894, Willem Hendrik married Antoinette 
Bredell of Schoemanshoek, and with her inheritance, he built the present-day 
homestead of Constantia Uitsig.22 Willem Hendrik Lategan proved himself to 
be progressive and up to date in his methods, and with hard work and energy, he 
turned Constantia Uitsig into one of the finest fruit and wine farms in the Colony.23 
He made a special study of the export trade and his trade with England and the 
continent increased annually. He was also considered an authority on all matters 
relating to the fruit industry.24 He was a director of the Cape district of the KWV 
from 1925 until 1940,25 a member of both the Fruit Growers Association of SA and 
the Western Province Agricultural Association.26 He was also the Chairman of the 
Constantia Co-operative Association of Farmers, a Landbank valuator, a justice of 
the peace, and a member of the then Rural Council.27 He was interested in politics 
and was a prominent member of General Louis Botha’s Suid-Afrikaanse Party.28
3In 1988, the farm, Constantia Uitsig, was purchased by David and Marlene 
McCay.29 Together they restored the farm to its former glory, and Constantia Uitsig 
now boasts award-winning wines, three world-renowned and award-winning 
restaurants, a private cricket oval, a spa (the only one in South Africa to offer “Les 
Aromes du Vin”, a body treatment based on the aromatic components of fine wines), 
and a 16-roomed luxury hotel. In 2006, fifty per cent of the wine estate was bought 
by a consortium. Just 20 minutes away from the heart of the city of Cape Town, 
Constantia Uitsig is truly Cape Town’s own vineyard.
Factual background of the Lategan case
1In May 1920, the wine farmer, Willem Hendrik Lategan (“Lategan”), entered into 
an agreement in terms of which he disposed of the wine that he had made during the 
20 Home page of Constantia Uitsig. [Online] Available at http://www.constantia-uitsig.com/pages/wine-estate.php. 
[Accessed: 14 May 2013].
21 Supra.
22 Supra.
23 1906. Men of the Times Old Colonists of the Cape Province and the Orange River Cologny, Johannesburg: The Transvaal 
Publishing Co.
24 Supra.
25 Van Zyl, D.J. 1918 – 1993, KWV.




29 Home page of Constantia Uitsig. [Online] Available at http://www.constantia-uitsig.com/pages/wine-estate.php. 
[Accessed: 14 May 2013.]
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year of assessment, which ended on 30 June 1920, to the KWV for the sum of £5,924. 
Of this sum, £3,500 was payable and, subject to certain deductions mentioned below, 
paid prior to 30 June 1920. The balance was payable in instalments after that date.
2In terms of the articles of association of the KWV, two amounts, “retention” 
money and “contribution” money, were deducted from the amount payable to 
Lategan and retained by the KWV. The “retention” money was applied by the KWV 
towards its working expenses, but this was later to be paid to the taxpayer, whilst 
the “contribution” money was in part treated as a contribution to the administrative 
costs of the KWV. The balance of the contribution money was retained by the KWV 
as a reserve, with Lategan being entitled to receive shares in the KWV of equivalent 
value.
3Lategan argued that the amount of the debt payable in a future year of assessment 
had not accrued to him in the current year, and that he was liable to tax in the 
current year in respect of the £3,500 actually received only. He also claimed both the 
amounts deducted by the KWV as “retention” money and “contribution” money as 
expenses incurred in the production of income.
4In his assessment of Lategan, the Commissioner for Inland Revenue (“the CIR”) 
(as he was then known) included the whole amount for which the wine had been 
sold, namely £5,924, as gross income in the determination of the taxable income for 
the year of assessment which ended on 30 June 1920. The CIR only allowed that part 
of the “contribution” money applied towards meeting the administrative costs of the 
KWV as an expense incurred “in the production of the income”.30
Lower Court fi ndings
1On appeal against a rejection of the taxpayer’s objection to his assessment, the 
Special Court for the Cape Province ruled in favour of Lategan in respect of the 
disallowance of the deduction in respect of the “retention” money, holding those 
amounts to be an outgoing incurred in the production of the income. However, the 
court confirmed the assessment on the amounts not yet paid to Lategan. It also held 
that the instalment payable after the close of the year of assessment had accrued to 
Lategan in the year of assessment ending on 30 June 1920, and that the balance of 
the “contribution” money, in respect of which Lategan had been entitled to receive 
shares, had rightly been treated as income which had accrued to Lategan and had 
been capitalised on his behalf.
30 Section 17(1)(a) of the 1917 Act, now equivalent to section 11(a) of the Act.
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The Cape Provincial Division of the Supreme Court
1Lategan thereupon required a case to be stated to the Cape Provincial Division of 
the Supreme Court (“CPD”) in terms of section 86 of Act 41 of 1917, submitting for 
decision on the following questions:
(a) Should instalments, which in terms of the agreement of sale were not payable 
during the year of assessment, be regarded as gross income within the meaning 
of section 6 of the 1917 Act?
(b) Should the amounts retained by the KWV be regarded as gross income or, 
alternatively, could this amount be deducted from his income under section 
17(1)(a) of the said Act?
1Question (a) pertains to the timing of the accrual of income. Flowing from the 
timing question, the CPD also addressed the valuation of such amounts not received 
before the end of the year of assessment.
2Regarding the timing question, Watermeyer J found that:31
 – The definition of “gross income” does not seem to limit receipts of money in the 
year of assessment to such receipts as were the reward of work done or capital 
employed in the year of assessment. So far as receipts were concerned, the time of 
the receipt seemed to be looked to rather than the time when the work was done 
which earned the receipt. So far as earnings which were due but had not been 
received were concerned, the time when the work was done was looked to and not 
the time of receipt.
 – The taxpayer’s income for taxation purposes included not only the cash that he 
had received or which had accrued to him, but the value of every other form of 
property which he had received or which had accrued to him, including debts and 
rights of action.
 – The words in the Act “has accrued to or in favour of any person” merely meant “to 
which he has become entitled.”
3Addressing the valuation aspect of accrual Watermeyer J found the CIR’s inclusion 
of the face value of the accrual to be wrong and held that:32
 – So far as a debt was concerned which was payable in the future and not in the year 
of assessment, it might be difficult to hold that the cash amount of the debt had 
31 W H Lategan v CIR, 1926 CPD 203, 2 SATC 16 at 20.
32 W H Lategan v CIR, 1926 CPD 203, 2 SATC 16 at 21.
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accrued to the taxpayer in the year of assessment. He had not become entitled to 
a right to claim payment of the debt in the year of assessment but he had acquired 
a right to claim payment of the debt in future. This right had vested33 in him, 
had accrued to him in the year of assessment and it was a valuable right which he 
could turn into money if he wished to do so.
 – The value of this right must be included in the taxpayer’s gross income for taxation 
purposes.
 – The instalments had to be regarded as gross income but something had to be 
deducted from their face value to allow for the fact that they were not payable at 
the close of the year of assessment.
 – Assuming that the right to receive the instalments had not been converted into 
money by sale or otherwise during the year of assessment, the value to be fixed 
would be the present value of the instalments at the end of the year (30 June 1920).
1The Lategan case, in summary, therefore established a timing rule by stating that 
“accrued to or in favour of ” means “to become entitled to”. Amounts in respect of 
which a taxpayer has obtained a right to claim payment in a future year of assessment 
have, accordingly, become vested or accrued during that year of assessment. Such 
accrued amounts must be included in gross income in the year of assessment during 
which the right was so obtained. It also created a valuation rule by stating that 
the present value of accruals at year end (and not the face value of the accrual) 
is the value of the right that has accrued and that this discounted value must be 
included in gross income. It is submitted that the court, in establishing the valuation 
rule which discounts the value of accruals, took the time value of money and the 
economic reality of doing business into account and thereby applied an approach 
to the interpretation of the words “accrued to” that equates to what is the purposive 
approach to the interpretation of statutes.
2Regarding question (b): whether the amounts retained by the KWV as retention 
monies should be regarded as gross income, Watermeyer J agreed with the decision 
of the Special Court that the retention monies constituted part of the accrual. In 
addition, that part of the “contribution” money retained by the KWV on Lategan’s 
behalf also formed part of the accrual of income since it had been capitalised on 
33 Watermeyer JA, in 1940, in the case of Jewish Colonial Trust Ltd v Estate Nathan, 1940 AD 163 at 175-6, made it 
clear that income that accrues to a taxpayer is income to which he has a vested right rather than a contingent right, 
in the sense that a “vested right” is a right of ownership, including the right of enjoyment, which may, however, be 
postponed, and that a “contingent right” is a “chance or a possibility of a right”. De Koker, A. and Williams, R.C. 2013. 
Silke on South African Income Tax, Durban: LexisNexis, at para 2.11, submit that an accrued right is a vested right 
notwithstanding any postponement of the enjoyment of the right.
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Lategan’s behalf. It was further not allowable as a deduction under section 17(1)(a) 
of the 1917 Act.
Case law on the meaning of accrual subsequent to the Lategan 
case
1In the Ochberg case, Watermeyer J effectively restricted the principle of “entitled 
to” as established in the Lategan case.34 He held that, as soon as an unconditional 
sale had been concluded, the taxpayer’s right to claim the purchase price in defined 
instalments at defined future dates vested in him or accrued to him. In other words, 
accrual takes place when the taxpayer is unconditionally entitled (author’s emphasis) 
to claim payment of the instalments. The Appellate Division confirmed this principle 
in the Mooi case and held that a distinction should be borne in mind between a right 
which vests immediately but relates to a payment in future and a right which does 
not come into existence at all until a condition has been fulfilled.35 It was further 
held that it is inappropriate to regard an “amount” as having accrued to a taxpayer 
when the right granted to him is conditional or it cannot be exercised until he, on 
his side, has completed the performance of some obligation resting upon him.36 De 
Koker and Williams37 submit that this principle would not apply if the conditions 
related merely to a postponement of the date on which the taxpayer could enjoy the 
right. It is therefore clear that the judiciary restricted the meaning of “accrual” by 
only including vested rights, as opposed to contingent rights, in gross income and 
it is therefore important not to confuse a condition in an agreement that postpones 
the accrual with a term of payment or the granting of credit that is not a condition.
2The Supreme Court of Appeal in both CIR v Delfos38 and Hersov’s Estate v CIR39 
presented another school of thought regarding the meaning of “accrual” by remarking 
that “accrued to or in favour of” means that “the amount is due and payable” 
notwithstanding vested rights. This gave rise to the controversy which persisted for 
decades. The issue of whether an amount accrues when the taxpayer is “entitled to” 
it (in other words, when the amount is merely due) – Watermeyer’s view – or when 
the amount is “due and payable” (in other words, at the time for payment stipulated 
in the agreement) – the Supreme Court of Appeal’s view – remained unanswered for 
several years.
34 Ochberg v CIR, 1933 CPD 256, 6 SATC 1.
35 Mooi v SIR,, 1972 (1) SA 674, 34 SATC 1.
36 Supra.
37 De Koker, A. and Williams, R.C. 2013. Silke on South African Income Tax, Durban: LexisNexis, at para 2.11.
38 CIR v Delfos, 1933 (AD) 242, 6 SATC 92 at 111.
39 Hersov’s Estate v CIR, 1957 (1) SA 471 (A), 21 SATC 106.
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The practice of the CIR after the Lategan decision
1In terms of the principle of legal precedence, the CIR and all subordinate courts 
are bound by decisions of the SCA.40 The CIR is not bound by the decisions of the 
Provincial Divisions of the High Court and, although a specific Provincial Division 
is bound by the decisions of the SCA as well as by its own decisions, Provincial 
Divisions are not bound by the decisions of other Provincial Divisions.41 Since the 
Lategan case was a CPD decision and not a SCA decision, it only created legal 
precedence for the CPD and other subordinate courts. The CIR was only bound 
to follow the decision for that specific case. It was not bound to follow the SCA 
opinions (about “due and payable”) as they were regarded as obiter dicta, and 
although of great persuasive power, they did not create precedent.
2In practice, the CIR, however, applied the timing rule stated in the Lategan 
case (accrual means “entitled to”) as the generally prevailing practice regarding 
the meaning of “accrual” (and not the “due and payable” meaning). The CIR did 
not, however, permit42 any deduction in order to discount to its present value an 
amount that had accrued but would be received only in the future.43 The valuation 
rule decided in the Lategan case was not applied in practice by the CIR, and it was 
only after the People’s Stores case that possible reasons for following that route were 
advanced.
Commissions of inquiry after the Lategan decision
1Two commissions of inquiry addressed the controversy relating to the accrual 
principle. In 1970, the Commission of Inquiry into the Fiscal and Monetary 
Policy in South Africa,44 also known as the Margo Commission, appeared to be in 
favour of the ”entitled to” principle as envisaged in the Lategan case. The Margo 
Commission stated that the judgment in Lategan “represents the current law” and 
that no legislative resolution of the meaning of the word “accrued” was necessary.
40 Stiglingh, M., Koekemoer, A.D., van Schalkwyk, L., Wilcocks, J.S. & De Swart, R. 2014. Silke: South African Income Tax, 
Durban: LexisNexis, at 9.
41 Supra. 
42 For an exception in this regard, see ITC 437 (1939) 10 SATC 456 where the Commissioner has applied the valuation 
rule. Instead of allowing a spread over for the payment of the purchase price in instalments, he has discounted the 
value of the instalments to be received in the future to bring them to present-day value, and taxed everything as ac-
cruing in one year.
43 De Koker, A. and Williams, R.C. 2013. Silke on South African Income Tax, Durban: LexisNexis, at para 2.9.
44 The Commission of Inquiry into the Fiscal and Monetary Policy in South Africa. 1970. Taxation in South Africa, Second 
Report, RP 86/1970 at para 32.
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2In 1987, the Commission of Inquiry into the Tax Structure of the Republic of 
South Africa45 clearly preferred the “entitled to” meaning above the “due and payable” 
meaning. It recommended that:46
… Income should be recognized when all events have occurred which fi x the right to 
receive it and the amount thereof can be determined with reasonable accuracy; but due al-
lowance should be made for the futurity of the right beyond twelve months. 
1Although this recommendation in effect supported the valuation rule established 
in the Lategan case in respect of rights to receive money beyond 12 months, no 
amendments to the Act or the general prevailing practice of the CIR regarding the 
valuation rule were made.
The fi nal word: The People’s Stores case47
1The case that finally provoked the legislative resolution of the controversy48 
surrounding both the timing rule and the valuation rule regarding accruals of 
income was the SCA case of People’s Stores. The taxpayer, a subsidiary in the Edgars 
group of companies, was a retailer which provided finance under a six-month, 
revolving-credit scheme. It claimed that instalments not yet payable under the 
scheme as at the end of the year of assessment should either not be included in gross 
income because they had not yet accrued, or, if included, should be discounted to 
their present value before inclusion. From the facts of the People’s Stores case it is 
clear that the right to receive the future instalments was a vested right and that 
no conditions applied. The taxpayer was therefore unconditionally entitled to the 
instalments (as per the Mooi case).
2A unanimous decision was given by the SCA in favour of both the timing rule 
(“accrued to or in favour of” means “to become entitled to”) and the valuation rule 
(the present value of accruals, and not the face value thereof, is the value of the right 
that has accrued) established in the Lategan case. This meant that the outstanding 
instalments were included in gross income since the taxpayer was (unconditionally) 
entitled to receive the amounts. However, the amount had to be discounted to its 
present value and the discounted value had to be included in gross income in the year 
of the accrual.
45 The Commission of Inquiry into the Tax Structure of the Republic of South Africa. 1987. Report of the Commission of 
Inquiry into the Tax Structure of the Republic of South Africa, RP 34/1987 at paras 9.9 and 9.10.
46 Supra 1987: 170.
47 CIR v People’s Stores (Walvis Bay) (Pty) Ltd, 1990 (2) SA 353 (A), 52 SATC 9.
48 De Koker, A. and Williams, R.C. 2013. Silke on South African Income Tax, Durban: LexisNexis, at para 2.9.
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Intervention by the Legislator
1Shortly after the landmark ruling in People’s Stores, the legislature intervened and 
amended the Act by introducing two provisos to the general definition of ”gross 
income” and thereby eliminating the discounting principle as provided for in the 
judgment. These two provisos were promulgated in 1990 with retrospective effect 
to transactions entered into on or after 1 July 1962. De Koker and Williams49 
explain that the then Deputy Minister of Finance, Dr G. Marais, recommended the 
retrospective effect of the amendment in the light of the long-established practice 
by the CIR not to discount the value of accruals and this recommendation had been 
accepted by the legislature.
2The Lategan interpretation of the words “accrued to or in favour of” was confirmed 
and legislated for by the first part of the first proviso, which provides “where during 
any year of assessment the taxpayer has become entitled to (author’s emphasis) an 
amount which is payable on a date or dates falling after the last day of such year …”. 
De Koker and Williams50 conclude that it is now settled law that there is an accrual 
when a seller is entitled to an amount because he or she has an unconditional right 
to claim payment of a debt (and the purchaser has an absolute and unqualified legal 
liability to pay the purchase price) and it is a valuable right which the seller can turn 
into money if he or she wishes to.51
3The second part of the first proviso states that if the taxpayer has, on or before 23 
May 1990, submitted a return of income drawn on the basis that the present value 
of such an amount has accrued to him or her during such year, the present value 
of such amount must be included in gross income. In terms of the second proviso, 
the difference between the amount received in any subsequent year and the present 
value included in the first year must, however, be included in gross income in the 
subsequent year. The effect is therefore that the taxpayer will be taxed on the full 
face value (as on the date of accrual) of the amount that has accrued, albeit over two 
different years of assessment. The second proviso further states that in all other cases 
(if a return is submitted after 23 May 1990), the amount (the face value and not the 
present value) must be included in gross income. The effect of the second part of 
the first proviso to the definition of “gross income”, read together with the second 
proviso, is to overturn the judgment of the SCA by nullifying the valuation rule with 
retrospective effect from 1 July 1962.
49 De Koker, A. and Williams, R.C. 2013. Silke on South African Income Tax, Durban: LexisNexis, at par 2.6 footnote 16.
50 Supra at par 2.6 footnote 16 referring to the Lategan case as well as ITC 1557 (1992) 55 SATC 218 and ITC 1824 
(2008) 70 SATC 27.
51 The authors combined the entitled to principle of the Lategan case and the fact that the entitlement must be uncon-
ditional as established in the Ochberg case in their conclusion.
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4Jiyane52 submits that these amendments to the definition of “gross income” 
did not bring any clarity to the meaning of the term “accrued to”, but instead they 
distorted even further the little harmony that existed between the income tax system 
and commercial and economic reality. He stated that the amendments equate in 
value for tax purposes the cash payment and an amount receivable in the near future, 
and that this does not make any economic and business sense.53
5Van Schalkwyk,54 the present author, has previously submitted that the cut-
off date, namely the submission of a return on or before 23 May 1990 is, from the 
viewpoint of a taxpayer, arbitrary and unfair. She further opined that the back-dated 
commencement date of 1 July 1962 nullifies all tax planning done by taxpayers, 
and that the time value of money and the difference between cash transactions 
and transactions on credit are completely ignored for tax purposes. She also stated 
that overlooking the judgment of the SCA in the People’s Stores case could lead to 
disrespect for the Act and could reduce the tax morality of taxpayers.
6The Taxation Laws Amendment Act 31 of 2013 replaced the first proviso and 
deleted the second proviso in its entirety. These amendments came into operation 
on 12 December 2013. The only explanation for these amendments in the Clause by 
Clause Explanation of the Draft Taxation Laws Amendment Bill, 2013 is that “the 
amendment updates wording and deletes obsolete wordings”. The first proviso now 
only confirms that if a person has, during a year of assessment, become entitled to 
an amount which is payable on a date after the last day of that year of assessment, 
that amount shall be deemed to accrue to him or her during such year of assessment. 
As discussed above, the effect of the retrospective enactment of the (now deleted) 
second part of the first proviso read together with the second proviso was to nullify 
the valuation rule. Accruals of income have therefore been included in gross income 
at face value since 23 May 1990, and the deletion of the second proviso consequently 
has no practical impact. While it is true that the date of 23 May 1990 in paragraph (a) 
of the previous first proviso was obsolete, it is unfortunate that these deletions now 
completely remove the history of the valuation rule from the Act. It also raises the 
question whether the constitutionality of the retrospective nature of the nullification 
of the valuation rule can still be challenged now that it has been deleted from the Act.
52 Jiyane, G.N. “Received by” and ”accrued to”. 2008. Durban: University of KwaZulu-Natal, at 10. 
53 Supra.
54 Van Schalkwyk, L. 1990. Die betekenis van die toevallingsbegrip in die Inkomstebelastingwet 58 van 1962. Pretoria: 
Universiteit van Pretoria, at 106–107.
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Legal interpretation and the Constitution
1The judgments on the issue of accrual were all delivered prior to the current 
constitutional regime. As the Constitution is the supreme law of South Africa,55 
every Act of Parliament is subject to the provisions of the Constitution. Furthermore, 
any Act found to be inconsistent with the Bill of Rights contained in Chapter 2 of 
the Constitution is unlawful.56 In the interpretation of statutes, the spirit, purport 
and objects of the Bill of Rights must be promoted.57
2Before the 1993 Constitution, the approach to the interpretation of statutes in 
South Africa was in a transitional phase from the literal approach58 to the contextual 
or purposive approach.59 Goldswain60 states that, since the advent of the Constitution, 
the arguments against the continued application of the strict and literal rule have 
gained momentum, and many commentators, including the judiciary, have suggested 
that the purposive approach should be followed, which will promote the democratic 
values enshrined in the Constitution.
3Goldswain further suggests that, with the judiciary virtually forced by the 
Constitution to follow the purposive approach, a realistic opportunity exists for a 
taxpayer to question and even have unjust interpretation decisions of the past reversed 
in the appropriate circumstances.61 In the light of the fact that the canons of taxation 
accord with the democratic values enshrined in the Constitution, it is submitted that 
they can assist with the purposive approach to the interpretation of statutes and are 
accordingly taken into account in the discussion below.
4Section 33(1) of the Constitution provides that “everyone has the right to 
administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair”. Brynard62states 
that the expectations in terms of the Constitution include, inter alia, that public 
officials remain within their lawful authority and act reasonably and fairly. The 
intention is to create a system of justice that attempts to ensure that lawful and 
55 Stiglingh et al. 2014. Silke: South African Income Tax, Durban: LexisNexis, at 8.
56 Supra.
57 Section 39(2) of the Constitution.
58 Supra at 9. In applying the literal approach or so-called “golden rule of interpretation”, the interpreter primarily con-
centrates on the literal meaning of the words of the provisions which must be interpreted to determine the intention 
of the legislator.
59 Supra at 10. In the contextual or purposive approach of the European law, the purpose of the legislation is deter-
mined by taking into account all surrounding circumstances and resources.
60 Goldswain, G.K. 2008. The Purposive Approach to the Interpretation of Fiscal Legislation: The Winds of Change, 
Meditari Accounting Research, Vol.16 No. 2, 107–121 at 114.
61 Supra at 119. Explaining that the new novus actus interveniens or new intervening factor, the Constitution demands 
fairness and equity in judicial matters, he states that to consider the economic realities when deciding a case is a 
prerequisite for fairness and equity and accords with the spirit and purport of the Constitution.
62 Brynard, D.J. The Constitution and Administrative Justice. [Online] Available at http://www.unisa.ac.za/Default.asp?
Cmd=ViewContent&ContentID=11619. [Accessed: 24 May 2014].
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reasonable decisions are made by following fair procedures.63 Brynard explains 
that, because a reasonable decision is one based on reason (which means that all 
the jurisdictional facts must be considered), this implies that the decision must be 
capable of objective substantiation. In an effort to justify their actions, public officials 
therefore have to take their decisions with care in order to adhere to the standards of 
rationality and logic.64
5Hoexter65 explains that the right to procedural fairness entitles a person to “the 
principles and procedures … which in [the] particular situation or set of circumstances 
are right and just and fair”. He also expresses the view that for administrative action 
to be “reasonable”, it must be rational,66 and Croome67 states that this means that the 
decision must be justifiable in light of the information known to the administrator 
and the reasons supplied for that decision. Hoexter68 further explains that for an 
administrative action to be reasonable, it must be proportional and in this regard 
explains that the purpose thereof is to avoid an imbalance between the adverse and 
beneficial effects of an action and to encourage the administrator to consider both 
the need for the action and the possible use of less drastic or oppressive means to 
accomplish a desired end.
6While keeping the aforementioned principles of reasonable decisions, the 
standards of rationality and logic and the possible use of less oppressive means to 
accomplish the desired end in mind, the impact of the Constitution and the canons 
of taxation on the timing and valuation rules are now scrutinised.
The impact of the Constitution and the canons of taxation on the 
timing and valuation rules
The timing rule
1Watermeyer J, in the Lategan case, did not give any explanation for his opinion that 
the words “accrued to or in favour of ” merely mean “to which a person has become 
entitled”. The dictionary meaning of the word “accrued” is:
63 Supra.
64 Supra.
65 Hoexter,C. 2002. The New Constitutional and Administrative Law Volume Two Administrative Law, Juta & Co, Ltd, par 
5.1.
66 Hoexter, C. 2007. Administrative Law in South Africa, Juta & Co, Ltd, 307.
67 Croome, B. 2010. Taxpayer’s Rights in South Africa, Kenwyn: Juta & Co, Ltd, 25.
68 Hoexter, C. 2007. Administrative Law in South Africa, Juta & Co, Ltd, 309–310.
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 – To come into existence as a claim that is legally enforceable.69
 – To become a present and enforceable right or demand.70
 – An amount earned in the current accounting period, but which will be received 
in a subsequent period.71
1Comparing the meaning Watermeyer J attributed to the words and the corresponding 
dictionary meanings of the word “accrued”, it seems possible that a strict and literal 
interpretational approach was followed in order to hold that an enforceable claim or 
right would mean that a person is entitled to the amount which is the subject of the 
claim or right. The question must be considered whether a court today, in following 
a purposive approach and taking into account the economic reality of taxing an 
amount of income before it is received, the canons of equity and of convenience, as 
well as the principles around just administrative action, would rule differently.
2The canon of equity aims at providing economic and social justice to the people.72 
Goldswain73 links the principle of equity to the purposive approach to interpretation74 
by stating that this approach was favoured by the Roman-Dutch writers because it 
included the principle of equity, a principle embodied in natural law. He further 
refers to a remark by Corbett CJ75 (well known for his strict and formalistic approach 
to the interpretation of fiscal legislation) that, even though it has been said that “there 
is no equity about a tax”, there is nevertheless a measure of satisfaction to be gained 
from a result which seems equitable, both from the point of view of the taxpayer and 
the point of view of the fiscus.
3According to the equity principle, every person should pay to the government in 
proportion to his or her ability to pay. It is submitted that it is not equitable to expect 
that a taxpayer must be able to pay the tax on amounts which accrued to him or her 
69 The Free Dictionary by Farlex. [Online] Available at http://www.thefreedictionary.com/accrued. [Accessed: 14 May 
2013].
70 Dictionary.com. [Online] Available at http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/accrued. [Accessed: 14 May 2013].
71 Business Dictionary. [Online] Available at http://www.businessdictionary.com/defi nition/accrued-income.html. [Ac-
cessed: 14 May 2013]. Note that business dictionaries generally provide a subject-specifi c defi nition. In the interpre-
tation of statutes, the ordinary dictionary meaning must be applied – in other words, the meaning as used by the 
ordinary person on the street. However, in light of the relevance of this defi nition to the facts of the Lategan case, 
this defi nition has value and is therefore included.
72  Kalyan City Life. What is Tax – Defi nition – Adam Smith’s Canons of Taxation. [Online] Available at http://kalyan-city.
blogspot.com/2010/12/what-is-tax-defi nition-adam-smith.html. [Accessed: 14 May 2013].
73 Goldswain, G.K. 2008. The Purposive Approach to the Interpretation of Fiscal Legislation: the Winds of Change, 
Meditari Accounting Research, Vol.16 No. 2, 107-121 at 115.
74 Supra at 111, stating that, in brief, the purposive approach seeks to ascertain the intention of Parliament by reading 
the Act as a whole and placing in context the ends that sought to be achieved and the relationship between the 
individual provisions of the Act.
75 Made in CIR v Nemojim (Pty) Ltd, 1983 (4) SA 935 (AD), 45 SATC 241 T at 267, some ten years prior to the adoption 
of the Constitution.
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but which have not yet been received by him or her. Accordingly, the taxpayer must 
fund the tax so payable from another source of income or by having to realise his or 
her capital.76 It is therefore submitted that the timing rule is not equitable.
4As a counter-argument, it might be reasoned that including both the receipts 
and accruals of a taxpayer in gross income is fair and equitable in the sense that a 
taxpayer is also allowed deductions (in terms of section 11(a) of the Act) for amounts 
actually incurred77 and not only for amounts actually paid. The accrual principle, 
however, gives rise to a cash-flow disadvantage; while the incurral principle creates a 
cash-flow advantage, and it cannot be argued that the latter is inequitable in respect 
of the taxpayer. However, from the perspective of the ficus, the incurral principle 
equates to less revenue.
5In terms of the canon of convenience, the mode and timing of a tax payment 
should be, as far as possible, convenient to taxpayers. It is difficult to perceive how 
having to pay tax on an amount before it is received, can ever be convenient to a 
taxpayer. It is therefore submitted that the canon of convenience is also compromised 
by the timing rule. That said, paying taxes is generally perceived (although possibly 
in jest) as an inconvenience.
6Croome,78 after discussing whether the power of the state to impose tax is a violation 
of the right to property in that tax amounts to an unlawful deprivation of property, 
concludes that, in principle, taxation could not amount to a deprivation. He, however, 
refers to the Irish High Court decision in Daly v the Revenue Commissioners79 where 
Costello J held that if a particular provision fails the proportionality test because it 
produced results that were unfair to taxpayers in that they caused taxpayers hardship, 
a taxpayer will succeed to show that his or her rights have been subject to “an unjust 
attack”.80 Croome argues, based on Daly, that if South Africa were to introduce a 
taxing measure that would cause undue hardship to taxpayers, it would not pass 
muster under section 25 of the Constitution and a court should strike such measure 
down.81
7Regarding the timing rule, it is finally submitted that if courts today take the 
principle of just administrative action and all external aids into account when 
76 Wessels JA, in a minority view in the Ochberg case, argued that the principle underlying the Act is that a taxpayer 
pays his or her tax not from capital but from his or her earnings. He concluded that if a taxpayer is obliged to realise 
his or her capital in order to pay income tax, it is contrary to the whole tenor of the Act.
77 Which, as held in Caltex Oil (SA) Ltd v SIR, 1971 (1) SA 665 (AD), 37 SATC 1, does not merely mean “paid” but means 
all expenditure for which a liability has been incurred during the year, whether the liability has been discharged or not.
78 Croome, B. 2010. Taxpayer’s Rights in South Africa, Kenwyn: Juta & Co, Ltd. at 19 and 20.
79 [1995] 3 IR 1.
80 Daly supra at 8.
81 Daly supra at 9.
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following the purposive approach, the “due and payable” meaning (an amount is 
taxed at the time for payment stipulated in the agreement) would render an equitable 
alternative. This is because the “due and payable” meaning accords with the canons 
of equity and convenience since both the problem of funding the resulting tax liability 
and the disadvantage regarding paying tax on an amount before it is received are 
then eliminated. Further, no valuation of the accrual to be taxed needs to take place. 
It accords with the purposive approach to the interpretation of statutes by taking 
reasonableness, rationality and logic into account by using less oppressive means to 
accomplish the desirable end (viz. to tax accruals) and thus also adheres to the values 
enshrined in the Constitution. It is submitted that it might be time to test the timing 
rule constitutionally.
The valuation rule
1As previously submitted, the court, in establishing the valuation rule which discounts 
the value of accruals, took the time value of money and the economic reality of 
doing business into account and thereby applied an approach to the interpretation 
of the words “accrued to” that equates to what is the purposive approach to the 
interpretation of statutes. It is therefore submitted that the valuation rule would 
pass constitutional muster.
2The valuation rule as determined in both the Lategan and the People’s Stores cases82 
was, however, never applied in practice by the CIR. After the SCA had confirmed 
the valuation rule in the People’s Stores case, the CIR was, however, bound to follow 
it in terms of legal precedence. As already mentioned, the legislature intervened and 
negated the valuation rule through the enactment of two provisos to the general 
definition of “gross income”.
3The then Deputy Minister of Finance, Dr G. Marais, issued a press release83 after 
the People’s Stores case in which he, inter alia, suggested that the generally prevailing 
practice of Inland Revenue of not discounting accrual amounts was founded upon 
the “practical problems in determining the value of amounts payable in the future”. 
He also referred to other problems with the discounting of accruals, to the “subjective 
factors” upon which discounting is dependent, the fact that discounting makes the 
“requirement of certainty” unattainable (it is unclear on what grounds this statement 
was made) and the possibility that the difference between a subsequent payment and 
82 W H Lategan v CIR, 1926 CPD 203, 2 SATC 16; and CIR v People’s Stores (Walvis Bay) (Pty) Ltd, 1990 (2) SA 365 (A), 
52 SATC 9.
83 GG 12503 dated 23 May 1990.
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the original discounted accrual might not be taxable at all. It is suggested that an 
Interpretation Note explaining the factors to be taken into account when a debt is 
valued in order to arrive at an amount that can reasonably be obtained for the debt in 
the open market could have assisted in eliminating any such “practical problems in 
determining the value of amounts payable in the future”.
4It is difficult to understand how the decision to overturn a SCA judgment based 
on perceived problems with the discounting of accruals by enacting a retrospective 
amendment taking effect 28 years earlier can be capable of objective substantiation, 
or how it can be shown that this decision adheres to the standards of rationality and 
logic. In agreement with Goldswain,84 it is submitted that equity and fairness should 
never be allowed to make way for administrative expediency.
5Section 3(1) of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act85 requires that 
administrative action which materially and adversely affects the rights or legitimate 
expectations of any person to be procedurally fair. A detailed study of the meaning 
of “procedurally fair” falls beyond the scope of this study, but it is submitted that 
the past practice of SARS not to permit the valuation of accruals was unreasonable 
and not procedurally fair. If the Constitution (and PAJA) had been in place before 
this practice was turned into legislation by enacting the two provisos to the general 
definition of “gross income”, such practice could, it is submitted, have been challenged 
successfully in terms of the right to just administrative justice contained in section 
33(1) of the Constitution read together with section 3(1) of the PAJA.
6The two provisos to the definition of “gross income” which legislatively nullified 
the valuation rule were promulgated with retrospective effect almost immediately after 
the SCA’s ruling in the Peoples’ Stores case. It is questionable whether the retroactive 
nature of this legislative intervention is in accord with the canon of certainty and the 
requirements of the Constitution.
7According to Adam Smith,86 the tax an individual has to pay should be certain, 
not arbitrary. Taxpayers should know in advance how much tax is to be paid to the 
government, at what time the tax is to be paid, and in what form. Certainty can, inter 
alia, be brought about by a clearly worded Income Tax Act. It is submitted that the 
retrospective effect of the provisos introduced into the Act infringed the canon of 
certainty and that retrospective amendments to fiscal legislation should be made only 
84 Goldswain, G.K. 2008. The Purposive Approach to the Interpretation of Fiscal Legislation: The Winds of Change, 
Meditari Accounting Research, Vol.16 No. 2, 107–121 at 119.
85 Act 3 of 2000 (hereafter referred to as PAJA).
86 Kalyan City Life. What is tax – Defi nition – Adam Smith’s Canons of Taxation. [Online] Available at http://kalyan-city.
blogspot.com/2010/12/what-is-tax-defi nition-adam-smith.html. [Accessed: 14 May 2013].
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when justifiable. Bentley87 indicates that the introduction of retrospective legislation 
is justifiable when it corrects wrongs done to taxpayers, confers benefits that do not 
prejudice taxpayers and rectifies errors in legislation. It is clear that the retrospective 
nullification of the valuation rule does not fall into one of these categories and the 
constitutionality thereof might therefore be questionable.
8Croome88 contends that the introduction of fiscal legislation with retrospective 
effect constitutes a deprivation of property as envisaged in section 25 of the 
Constitution. He states further that, ideally, a change in taxing measures should 
relate to future events, because if it relates to past events it constitutes the confiscation 
of property held by the taxpayer before the measure’s enactment.89
9However, Croome also points out that the Constitution contains no specific 
prohibition against the introduction of tax amendments with retrospective effect, 
and that the introduction thereof must therefore be weighed against the existing 
provisions of the Constitution.90 He continues by stating that the Revenue Laws 
Amendment Act is a law of general application and that it would be difficult to 
set aside the enacted amendments in the light of the limitation of rights provision 
contained in section 36 of the Constitution.91 Section 36 specifically refers to ”less 
restrictive means to achieve the purpose” and Croome states that it is clearly preferable 
and more equitable for an amendment to take effect prospectively so that it applies to 
years of assessment commencing on or after a specific date.92
10The court, in Robertson & another v City of Cape Town & another; Truman-Baker v 
City of Cape Town,93 adopted the following approach in regard to the constitutionality 
of retrospective legislation:
 – Although far more pronounced in the area of criminal law, retroactive legislation 
poses difficulties for the rule of law, but the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa, 1996, does not contain any express provisions prohibiting retrospective 
legislation.
87 Bentley, D. 1998. Taxpayer’s Rights: An International Perspective, Revenue Law Journal, Queensland: Bond University, 
at 38.
88 Croome, B. 2010. Taxpayer’s Rights in South Africa, Kenwyn: Juta & Co, Ltd. at 66.
89 Supra. In footnote 250 he gives the example of when the legislature decided to introduce CGT the legislation was 
drafted to ensure that CGT did not arise on capital gains attributed to the period prior to 1 October 2001, that is, the 
date on which CGT came into force.
90 Croome, B. 2010. Taxpayer’s Rights in South Africa, Kenwyn: Juta & Co, Ltd. at 66–67.
91 Supra at 68.
92 Supra.
93 2004 (5) SA 412 (C).
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 – Retroactive legislation may be unconstitutional to the extent that it contravenes 
the rule of law when it unreasonably or unfairly impairs the ability of those bound 
by the law to regulate their conduct in accordance therewith.
 – The enactment of retroactive legislation in other constitutional democracies (such 
as the United States, Canada and India) has been held not to be unconstitutional.
1It therefore seems that the last word has not yet been spoken regarding the 
constitutionality of retrospective legislation. It is, however, submitted that the 
deletion of the two provisos which retrospectively negated the valuation rule 
complicated any possible constitutional challenge in this regard and possibly 
rendered the constitutionality of the retrospective nature of those amendments 
historically irrelevant.
Conclusion
1The words “accrued to or in favour of ” in the definition of “gross income” have 
not been amended since they were first introduced in that definition in 1917. 
Uncertainty about the meaning has, however, generated voluminous litigation over 
the 64 years since the first case on the matter in 1926. The SCA,94 in 1990, confirmed 
both the timing rule and the valuation rule established in the Lategan case.
2The timing rule established in the Lategan case was taken into legislation and it is 
now settled law that there is an accrual when a seller is entitled to an amount because 
he or she has an unconditional right to claim payment of a debt (and the purchaser 
has an absolute and unqualified legal liability to pay the purchase price) and if it 
is a valuable right which can be turned into money. It is submitted that the timing 
rule is not equitable or convenient and causes undue hardship to taxpayers because 
amounts are taxed before they have been received.
3It is also submitted that the “due and payable” meaning (an amount is taxed at the 
time for payment stipulated in the agreement) of “accrual” as originally postulated by 
the SCA95 complies with the canons of equity and convenience as both the problem 
of funding the resulting tax liability and the disadvantage regarding paying tax on 
an amount before it is received are then eliminated. Furthermore, no valuation of 
the accrual is necessary. It is finally submitted that if courts today take the principle 
of just administrative action and all external aids into account when following the 
purposive approach to the interpretation of statutes, the “due and payable” meaning 
94 In CIR v People’s Stores (Walvis Bay) (Pty) Ltd, 1990 (2) SA 365 (A), 52 SATC 9.
95 Established in CIR v Delfos, 1933 (AD) 242, 6 SATC 92; and Hersov’s Estate v CIR, 1957 (1) SA 471 (A), 21 SATC 106.
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would render an equitable alternative and that it might be time to test the timing rule 
constitutionally.
4The valuation rule stated in both the Lategan and People’s Stores cases96 that 
only the present value of accruals of income at year end (and not the face value) 
must be included in gross income. It is submitted that the valuation rule would pass 
constitutional muster. The legislature, however, has negated the valuation rule, 
thereby ensuring that the actual face value of accruals of income must be included in 
gross income. The retroactive nature of this legislative intervention infringed on the 
canon of certainty. The constitutionality of retrospective amendments is an unresolved 
issue, but it is submitted that the deletion of the two provisos which retrospectively 
negated the valuation rule complicated any possible constitutional challenge in this 
regard and possibly rendered the constitutionality of the retrospective nature of those 
amendments historically irrelevant.
5It is submitted that an application of the purposive approach to interpretation 
would have had a major impact on the decision in a seminal case like the Lategan 
case, and would probably have resulted in a decision more in line with the “due 
and payable” meaning. It remains to be seen whether the accrual principle enacted 
through the timing rule will ever be challenged on constitutional grounds.
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